# 1NC

## 1

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “USfg should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### The Resolution is the Stasis Point for deliberation – framing your advocacy in that context is key to contestation and meaningful debate

Steinberg & Freeley 8 (Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### The Unavoidable Competitive Framing of Debate Makes These Points of Clash Essential Drivers to In Depth Research and Innovative Strategies in Deliberation

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

Democracy is minimally defined as a form of governance in which policy decisions are made by a majority vote of the citizens. While useful as a rough way of classifying polities, this definition turns out, on closer examination, to be both ambiguous and radically incomplete. The main thrust of the critique of minimal democracy developed in contemporary democratic theory is that voting is not the best, or at least not the only, political mechanism for ensuring that policy decisions conform to the interests of the citizens. A key political mechanism that also serves that role and that is missing from the minimalist view of democracy is deliberation, and the appreciation of the effects of this mechanism is changing the way scholars of democracy think about democratic institutions.¶ In revealing correct, fuller, or simply better organized information, deliberation provides an opportunity for participants to arrive at more considered judgments of their own and to affect collective decision-making by influencing the judgments of others. Its consequences may affect what happens in a voting booth or in a legislative or a judicial chamber, or in the way we approach a personal moral conundrum. A political decision-making process that fails to create the opportunity for or to take advantage of these benefits of deliberation is bound to raise questions about the legitimacy of the resulting outcomes (Manin 1987; Habermas 1996; Cohen 1996).¶ Apart from the immediate effects of better information, deliberation contributes to the legitimacy of policy choices and of the underlying political institutions in a number of other ways. It can raise the sense of political autonomy and of the effective fairness of policy choices, enable a better assessment of fellow citizens’ motives with respect to a given political choice, and even encourage other-regarding motives on their part (Elster 1995). It may also increase the stability of collective choice by reducing the number of issue dimensions and introducing more structure into individual preferences (Johnson and Knight 1994; Dryzek and List 2003). But to have these effects, deliberation must bring about some kind of learning that can produce a change in participants preferences over choices.1 At bottom the transmission processing and aggregation of information that forms the basis of individual and collective decision-making is the engine that sets in motion the deliberative wheels.

#### Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### Their Approach to Debate Makes this Dialogue Impossible

Harrigan 08 (Casey, MA Wake Forest, NDT Champion and BA from Michigan State, “Against Dogmatism: a Continued Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 29 (2008)
A second exception to the rule of free expression must be made to limit irrelevant discussion and establish a common starting point for debate. In the rhetorical tradition, the belief in the necessity of a mutual topic of disagreement, known as stasis (meaning “standing” and derived from a Greek word meaning “to stand still”), has a long history dating back to Aristotle. Through several modes of proceeding, the topic of controversy between interlocutors is established and an implicit contract—that here is the shared point of disagreement—is created. Without stasis, opponents may argue back and forth without really disagreeing with each other because they are not truly speaking about the same subject. For example, when one debater argues that the United States should refuse to negotiate with North Korea to avoid legitimating its harmful human rights policies and the opponent responds that President Clinton’s accommodation of North Korea in the 1990s was the source of its current human rights dilemma, there is no true disagreement. Each position can be entirely true without discounting the other. In this instance, the truth-generating function of deliberation is short-circuited. To eliminate errors, fallacies must gradually be replaced by truths, correct positions must win out over incorrect ones, and strong arguments must gain more acceptance than weak ideas . This process requires conflict; it necessitates rejection. To determine that something is “true” requires that its converse is “false.” The statement that “snow is cold” requires the dismissal of its contrary. Such choices can only be made when there is a point of disagreement for debate to revolve around. Without stasis, the productive potential of deliberation is profoundly undermined. To avoid this scenario of “two ships passing in the night,” argumentation scholars have recognized the importance of a mutual agreement to disagree and have attempted to create guidelines to facilitate productive discussion. “Some agreed upon end or goal must be present to define and delimit the evaluative ground within which the interchange is to proceed,” writes Douglas Ehninger, “When such ground is lacking, argument itself … becomes impossible” (1958). Shively concurs, stating that, “we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it” (2000). In the academic context, policy debates create stasis by utilizing a year-long resolution that sets the topic for discussion. Affirmative teams must present a topical advocacy (one that fits within the bounds of the resolution) or they are procedurally disqualified. In public forums, the task falls upon moderators and discussion facilitators to set clear lines of relevance. Advocates, who frequently have strategic political incentives to avoid direct disagreement, need to be institutionally constrained by the framework for discussion. A position that favors a limited form of argumentative pluralism undermines the claims made by those who oppose SSD and wish to render certain controversial issues “off limits” from debate. Limits should be placed on the content of debate only because such choices as to what is debatable are inevitable, and, given that, it is preferable to choose the path that best protects the forum for deliberation by minimizing exclusion. The arbitrary choice about what content should and should not be “up for debate” threatens to render deliberation impossible–either all issues are up for debate, or none can be.

## Case

### Heroism

( ) Our Hero-ism K of micro-politics – their fear of co-optation means they work outside the system to their detriment. Micro creates an opportunity cost with the macro. They have it backwards – curriculum needs to *start* with the macro.

Jensen ‘9

Tim Jensen – Co-coordinator of the Ohio State University’s Digital Media Project. He coordinates “Candid Candidacy” and, at the time of this writing, is a PhD student in Philosophy, and is quoting Oliver Marchart is a professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne – Bridging Micro and Macro :: Setting the Stage – April 6, 2009 – http://candidcandidacy.wordpress.com/2009/04/06/bridging-micro-and-macro-setting-the-stage/

Oliver Marchart asks the same question in his essay, “Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap: Is There Such a Thing as a Post-subcultural Politics?“ “What criteria,” he asks, have to be met by micro-practices in order to ‘go macro’? Do we need a new concept of ‘organization’? Can there be a subcultural politics of pure particularism or does it take a dimension of universalism?’ Marchart begins by debunking what he sees as a heroism myth that dominates subcultures and those who study them academically. While others have certainly critiqued the narrative of “co-optation,” it’s still necessary to do so, and Marchart does it swiftly and with eloquence. I say that it’s still necessary becasue there are still plenty of folks (punks, activists, liberals) who believe they can “drop-out” of capitalism in many ways and narratives of “selling out” continue to proliferate. In this set-up, a subculture is designated as “authentic” to the degree that it remains unappropriated by the mainstream. The group or set of practices remains heroic in relation to how much it resists commodification and recuperation. Marchart notes that this narrative of the process of subculture’s incorporation into the mainstream construes “subcultures as some sort of substance–noise from the viewpoint of the dominant system, and the precedes any cooptation by the latter” (author’s emphasis 87). This myth is used to show how the “defending of micro-political practices eo ipso” obviates any move to the macro-political, since those micro-practices are always already political, “simply by virture (sic) of resisting cooptation” (88). Some theorists laud this indirect, style-driven form of dissent and its oblique challenge to exploitative powers. Not Marchart, for sure. And I have some pretty serious reservations about it, too. Who has time to take direct action when one is busy looking like they’re constantly dissenting? (This also becomes an issue, as we shall see in later posts, when dealing with internet cultures of protest.) Much of postmodernism and cultural studies in particular has done excellent–and needed–work in revealing the political nature of our everday acts. The cultural and the political have been blurred for some time now. But you can see where this may stunt the move to macro action: if we’re always already political, how do we judge a scale of action? I agree with Marchart that, “What is needed today is an analysis of the passage between culture and macro-politics, that is, an analysis of the process of ‘becoming macro’” (90). We’re missing an understanding of the links between everday life and organized, collective action, especially with regard to the communicative process. So we must ask, is an answer to be found in the micro-politics of everyday life or in the marco-political movements of collective will and deep structural and cultural reorganization? Where do we start in attempting to make sense of this line between micro and macro; and what role do information communication technologies play in the communication process of this movement between micro and macro? Marchart lists four preconditions for the passage of micro going macro: 1) A situation of explicit antagonization; 2) The emergence of a collectivity; 3) The function of organization; 4) A movement towards universalization. So, for Marchart, what is necessary is a swing towards the macro, a recognition that as long as resistance to hegemony remains at the level of symbolic rituals of the micro-political, we’re in trouble. Only when these tactics form a collective will they become politicized. Despite using a term like micro-political, Marchart argues there is no politics of the individual; politics is collective. And that is why he argues for theorization to begin at macro-levels.

They have it backwards – Learning macro-politics is a pre-requisite to successful micro-politics. Without it, micro-political *sub*-culture can’t re-aggregate to become *counter*-culture.

Marchart ‘4

Oliver Marchart is a professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne – Peace Review 16:4, December (2004), 415-420 – http://www.csub.edu/~mault/subcultures3.pdf

In what came to be called the "resistance through style" paradigm of early subcultural studies, subcultures were considered to be political eo ipso. From the point of view of these early theorists, subcultures were always already political, and what made them political was their style. Subcultures, according to this classical approach, do not challenge hegemony directly and openly but rather obliquely, through style. Rather than resorting to direct action, they concentrate on a subversive form of "indirect" action. For Dick Hebdige, for instance, punk was the classical example of "resistance through style" rather than resistance through political action. Such a form of articulation cannot reasonably be called political "protest." Hebdige in his early formulation had to rely on a hidden preference for subculture over counter-culture. Since the latter, for Hebdige, was not a working-class phenomenon, he explicidy decried political movements such as the Yippies as "middle-class." Political protest, however, cannot be reduced to a question of class posidon; in many cases it cuts across class lines. So what escaped traditional subcultural theorists because of these reductionist tendencies was precisely the question of the political, that is to say, the very logic by which forms of oblique resistance-through-style would turn into manifestly political forms of protest; or, to put it differently again, how merely subversive forms of subcultural activity would become part of oppositional action. The blindness on the part of subcultural theorists regarding macro-politics was simply due to the fact that they were not interested in how the subcultural could be transformed into the counter-cultural. This is understandable to the extent that in these early days their aim was to direct our attention to and rehabilitate micro-political forms of resistance previously considered "apolidcal, but what consequently escaped their attention was the way in which those micro-political forms of resistance would re-aggregate into macro-political formations. As we will see in a moment, in order to account for such political re-aggregation we need to employ a strong notion of antagonism- entirely absent from the early subcultural studies paradigm. As I said in the beginning, approaching the new protest formations with respect to their political potential requires taking into account the macropolitical context in which they emerge. Two aspects are of capital importance if we want to understand the role and function of these new protest formations. The first aspect is what I describe as "antagonization" and to which I will return later; the second is the very political or hegemonic "horizon" in front of which political protest occurs and is formulated. Let us for a moment dwell on this second aspect because it will allow us to gain some insight into the emancipatory nature of these new protest formations in reladon to more traditional movements on the left. It has been observed by some political theorists, including Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, that "democracy" has assumed the status of a horizon of intelligibility for all forms of polidcal articuladon today. But what are we to understand by "horizon"? In Laclau's definidon a horizon is something by which the limits and the terrain of constitudon of any possible object is established. For instance, the category of reason functioned within the Enlightenment not as a particular object but as a name for the very horizon of enlightenment itself so that every object would have to be constituted on the background of the horizon of enlightened radonality. To take a more openly political example: for Marxism, as Laclau reminds us, the eventual establishment of a "communist society" did not simply constitute one of many Marxist "policies;" rather, it was the very name for the horizon toward which all Marxist polidcs was directed. Obviously, this horizon has vanished. It has simply lost its intelligibility. We do not know what "communism," or "revoludon" for that matter, is supposed to mean, since it no longer consdtutes a horizon in front of which practical emancipatory politics could position itself (apart from empty rhetorics). Even the meaning of "socialism" has become increasingly uncertain, pardcularly after the victory of Blairite neoiiberal "third way" social democracy in Europe. In other words, the traditional horizon of large sectors of the left and of emancipatory struggle has experienced a deadly blow. On the other hand, the disintegradon of the traditional horizons of the left has led to ambiguous and contradictory results. A struggle occurred of highly diverse political forces to fill the vacuum that the bygone age of tradidonal emancipatory polidcs had left behind. On the national level, particularly in Europe, we witness today a series of racist and populist pardes of the far right having assumed the monopoly for oppositional polidcs. They turned out to be successful to such an extent that in many European countries, stardng with Austria in 2000, they eventually entered the government, in most cases in coalition with conservative pardes. This did not happen out of nothing but was the result of a long process of erosion of previous social-democratic hegemony—a consequence of a socialdemocradc politics of self-defeat. While there were certainly no communist or socialist sociedes in Western Europe during the second half of the twendeth century, there was something like an "overlapping" consensus centered around the idea of the welfare state. While this consensus was hegemonic primarily by involving conservadves, it was also the result of social struggles, union struggles, and social-democradc reforms in all areas of society. (The historical foundadon of that consensus reached back to the immediate post-war years and peaked in the 1970s.) When after the "red seventies" and the eonservadve interlude of the 1980s, socialdemocrats assumed power again in most countries of the European Union in the 1990s, they had already lost their hegemony. In other words, when they appeared at the peak of their power, they had in fact already lost it by giving in to neoiiberal ideas of the right, undermining their own stance. Hence, to a large degree the destrucdon of the European welfare state was carried out by social-democrats and is sdll carried out, for instance, by the Schroder government in Germany with its so-called "reforms." And where the United States is eoncerned, the middle-of-the-road strategy of the Clinton years prepared the terrain for the subsequent extremism of the Bush administration. Of course, the destrucdon of the welfare state has disturbing effects for the life of most people, but at the very moment in which their discontent needs to be articulated they are confronted with a vacuum on the left. The only choice they have is between social-democratic neoliberals and eonservative neoliberals marching in line with right-wing populists. In this desperate situation emancipatory polidcs is profoundly reformulated outside the realm of traditional party polidcs. What we are witnessing today is the ardeulation—the linking up—of many diverse social actors and the emergence of a new institutional form of deliberation among them: social fora. Many ofthe "new protest formations" take part in these emerging institutions—joining with less subculturally inclined actors such as ATT AC (activist promoters of the Tobin tax) or labor unions. By way of this ardeulation a public space for debate opens, and political action is no longer confined to fanciful (or sometimes violent) street demonstrations only. I do not intend, however, to downplay the importance of the latter, producing as it does what might be called "chains of equivalence" between different movements. Instead, I would like to direct attendon to the double-faced nature of this movement: On the one hand, an agonal space of deliberadon is ereeted among the different formations of the movement. This we might call the internal public sphere of these movements—the "social forum." On the other hand, and to. the extent that there is such a thing as a "movement of movements," some sort of equivalence between these movements has to be established. While in the case of the social forum what counts is the difference between the movements, in the case of what one may call the external public sphere it is their equivalence or unity. Such unity can be established only if an antagonism is erected vis-a-vis an external enemy. Both aspects, the "Arendtian" aspect of an agonal public sphere (internal) and the "Schmittian" aspect of an antagonistic public sphere (external), are indispensable if the movement is expected to be both emancipatory in a pluralistic way and polidcally effective. The antagonistic nature of the movement of movements can be observed most clearly on the global level. The traditional horizons of emancipadon have crumbled: socialist or communist internationalism is hardly an opdon today, and the non-aligned movement (the original "third way" before it was coopted by Blairism) belongs to a glorious past. Yet what emerged within the fissures of the old horizon of "international solidarity" is the anti-globalizadon movement as the first international movement that consists not of pardes or nation states but of "protest formations" aeting from within an international public sphere. This public sphere is constructed not only by way of the new eleetronic means of communication used by these forces but first and foremost by the display of dissent and the erecdon of an antagonism. Neoiiberal hegemony was visibly challenged on a global scale when the movement, pardcularly in its formative phase, engaged an "enemy," which at that time was, and to some extent still is, incarnated as the World Bank and the Internadonal Monetary Fund. Similarly, the internadonal peace movement of February 2003 against the impending U.S.-led war in Iraq managed to stage the largest global demonstrations in history. To deplore this sort of confrontation, most often enacted on the streets, as not particularly sophisdcated is to endrely misunderstand the nature of political struggle. The charge risks mixing up the funetion of an agonistic (internal) public sphere of deliberation with an antagonisdc (external) public sphere of dissent. Everybody who has ever taken part in both a social forum and a street demonstration knows the differenee. In the latter case, antagonism is staged between two fronts, thus excluding any sophisticated discussion about matters of "content," while in the former case a space is formed where a plurality of positions can engage in a meaningful debate. Both aspects, as I said, are vital if the movement is to evolve in a both political and emancipatory direction. Let us finally have a somewhat closer look at the emancipatory aspect of the new protest formations. The context in which they emerged confronts us with a contradictory situation. On the one hand, the old emancipatory horizons have disintegrated. On the other hand, it has been said, "democracy" has assumed the status of the undisputed hegemonic horizon. Wherever we turn, to put it blundy, "democracy" is the only game on the globe. But what is understood by "democracy" is not necessarily something emancipatory. In most cases it is the (neo)liberal Western version of "democracy U.S.-style"—consisting of a minimal institudonal framework and a free market economy. How do the new protest formations of the anti-globalization movement confront this dilemma: disappearance of the old emancipatory narratives on the one hand and undisputed victory of "democracy" as a Western instrument for global domination on the other? Although I do not have the spaee to fully develop the argument, I would like to submit the hypothesis that the new movement acts entirely from within the democratic horizon yet seeks to expand the latter into more radical direcdons. We have to come to an understanding of the anti-globalization movement as democratization movement. By remaining within the democratic horizon, the movement abandons the old and defunct narratives of "revoludon," thereby not aiming any longer at overthrowing the system (or opposing all forms of "globalization"). Instead, the main goal becomes the democratization of the institutions of internadonal economic (de)reguladon and, in extenso, the democratizadon of "democracy." In this respect it is highly relevant that it was the Zapatista uprising in the Chiapas province in 1994 which in a sense inaugurated the worldwide "movement of movements"—and still serves today as a role model for many anti-globalization protesters. What is relevant for our discussion is that the Zapatista movement was in fact a democratization movement. It did not resort to the recipes of earlier "Third World" liberation struggles of the Maoist kind, for instance. The aim of the Zapatistas was not to overthrow the Mexican government and to establish a People's Republic; it was to democratize the existing Mexican republic. Similarly, the aim of the anti-globalization movements, at least of the significant parts of it, does not consist of dismantling the dominant democratic horizon but of redefining democracy and thus^ while acting within the democratic horizon, radicalizing the scope and depth of "demoeracy." There is a striking resemblance here between the ideology of the new protest formations and the project of a "radical democracy," as it has been envisaged by political theory. It should be clear by now how the traditional approach of subcultural studies will not get us very far in describing the counter-cultural function of radical democratic protest formations. First, it does not provide us with the appropriate categories that would allow us to differentiate between emancipatory or democratic and regressive, undemocratic, or even neofascist forms of "resistance." And second, on a more fundamental level, it lacks a coherent theory of macro-politics and antagonism. For this reason it cannot really account for the very phenomenon of politicization. Hence, to restrict the analysis to matters of "style" rather than political mobilization will necessarily lead to a depoliticized account of subcultures—even as those theorists started with the opposite intention of politicizing cultural theory. Yet not all roads lead to Rome, and not all paths lead to politics. A notion of antagonism is indispensable if we wish to account for processes of politicization through which subcultures turn into counter-cultures and protest formations. The moment in which your identity becomes politicized is the moment in which you run up against something of the order of an antagonism. This moment has been framed most succinctly by Jerry Rubin's famous definition of the Yippie: a Yippie was a Hippie, Rubin said, who had been hit on the head by a polieeman. I'm tempted to think that this moment is precisely the moment of a political epiphany where the subject of eulture eonverts to polities. Perhaps truly politieal demonstrations do not take place on the roads to Rome but on the road to Damascus.

 ( ) Macro-politics should come before micro-politics

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These scholars and others point to the necessity of developing an analysis of adult education that encompasses not only social and cultural dimensions but microsocial theories of learning and teaching as well. Scholars in the broader field of the politics of education, such as Ball (1987) and Blase (1991a), have pointed out that macrolevel social, political, and cultural factors all influence the micropolitics of educational settings. Thus, the micropolitics of educational organizations and the teaching and learning that take place within them cannot be understood without some comprehension of the external environment in which they function.

( ) Micro-politics – even when politically potent – is doomed to fail and cede politics.

Dery ‘96

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Of course, techno-bricoleurs like Mark Pauline of Survival Research Laboratories better embody what you probably mean by "the myth of subversion." The rogue technologist who wages guerrilla war on the military-industrial complex with robots made out of appropriated, re-animated techno-trash has been enshrined, through William Gibson characters like Slick Henry in \_Mona Lisa Overdrive\_, in the cyberpunk pantheon, alongside the outlaw hacker. The problem with SRL-inspired fantasies of a techno-revolution by garbage pail kids is that they're underwritten by an incongruously Weathermen-esque faith in the power of a well-placed bomb to "strike at the heart of the state," as the Red Brigades put it. Obviously, it's a keystone assumption of postmodern analyses of the nonlinear dynamics of power, from Debord's \_Society of the Spectacle\_ to the Critical Art Ensemble's \_Electronic Disturbance\_, that power has etherealized---that control controls (to use a William S. Burroughsian turn of phrase) less by corporal punishment than by colonizing the mass imagination with media fictions that manufacture consent. Pauline is all too aware of this; SRL's theater of operations is founded on the assumption that even ritualized resistance to technocratic power produces tangible effects, if only in the minds of audience members. My critique of SRL in \_Escape Velocity\_ ends with Pauline saying, "I believe in the political potency of the symbolic gesture"---a quote that could easily do double duty as the battle cry of the cultural politics theorized by Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige, and their ilk. Unfortunately, symbolic resistance is just that: symbolic. It cedes territory in the larger cultural arena in the name of micropolitical resistance (an Achilles Heel it shares with virtual communitarianism, incidentally) and unwittingly lends itself to easy appropriation by consumer capitalism, which guts, skins, stuffs, and mounts "symbolic gestures," *no matter how politically potent,* with alarming speed. To invert Gibson's cyberpunk shibboleth, the strip mall finds its own uses for things, too. Finally, pockets of resistance that can't be malled beyond recognition may be allowed to function as petri dishes, culturing strange new memes in the consumer capitalist equivalent of a vaccine against more virulent political infestations. As Andrew Ross notes in \_Strange Weather\_, the cyberdelic counterculture championed by \_Mondo 2000\_, like the illicit enclave of Chiba City's Ninsei in \_Neuromancer\_, serves as an "experimental sounding board for legitimate industrial developers." Which brings us full circle to \_Wired\_, and its role as a cultural airlock for cyberlumpen in transit to Microserfdom. As political tactics these rituals of resistance---"myths of subversion," to use your term--- stand in relation to the raw power of nation-states and the multinational megaconglomerates fast rendering them obsolete as the Japanese stratagem of trying to start forest fires in the U.S. with incendiary devices made of paper and bamboo, floated over on the jet stream, stood in relation to the American atom bombs simultaneously falling on Japan.

( ) Micro-politics fails and is comparatively-worse than macro-politics

Cummings & Eagly ‘1

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The law and organizing model privileges local organizing as the centerpiece of social change practice. Relying significantly on postmodern [\*485] conceptions of political action, n178 which have emphasized small-scale resistance against subordination, n179 law and organizing proponents have viewed organizing as capable of fostering the type of local grassroots participation that leads to community empowerment. n180 Yet, while the ideal of local action has appealed to progressive scholars and activists, it has also been the subject of criticism by those who contend that, as a political strategy, it fails [\*486] to offer a coherent challenge to the larger institutional structures that produce poverty and inequality. Critics of localism have expressed concern about measuring the success of political action by an empowerment standard and have wondered whether local, neighborhood-based efforts can ultimately generate a viable progressive social movement. Carl Boggs, for example, has questioned the effectiveness of local organizing in light of the increasing consolidation of corporate power and the growing importance of global economic and political decision-making structures. n181 He argues that "one of the great ironies of the past two decades is that large-scale, macro, and global issues are increasingly met with local, often individual or privatized, outlooks and "solutions' which is yet another testament to political futility." n182 Handler has put forth a similar critique of the "new social movements," which he describes as "the archetypal form of postmodern politics - grass roots, protest from below, solidarity, collective identity, affective processes - all in the struggle against the established order outside the "normal' channels." n183 Handler suggests that these grassroots initiatives lack a comprehensive alternative social vision, which ultimately prevents them from developing institutional structures and challenging the hegemony of liberal capitalism. n184 Community development scholars have leveled similar critiques against localism, arguing that social change strategies focused on geographically discrete communities cannot sufficiently address the problems of racial isolation and poverty concentration that are generated by broader regional dynamics. n185 Community organizers [\*487] have also voiced concerns about the limitations of place-based neighborhood action strategies. n186 These criticisms raise legitimate questions about the efficacy of local organizing movements. How can local victories be leveraged into systemic, long-term changes in political and economic structures? How can local efforts be forged into a broader social movement? Although much attention has been focused on the benefits that grassroots organizing has produced for low-income communities, scholars and practitioners must begin to think more expansively about how community-based action can be linked to large-scale reform. \*\*\*\*relevant foot notes start here – they’re from the paragraph we quote\*\*\*\* n179. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 276 (stating that there has been a movement "from a macropolitics that focused on changing the structure of the economy and state to a micropolitics that aims to overturn power and hierarchy in specific institutions and to liberate emotional, libidinal, and creative energies repressed by the reality principle of bourgeois society"); Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere 213 (2000) (arguing that postmodernism is "oriented mainly toward the micro politics of everyday life" and "tends to dismiss in toto the realm of macro politics *and with it an indispensable locus of any large-scale project of social transformation"*); Boaventura da Sousa Santos, The Post Modern Transition: Law in Politics, in The Fate of Law 79, 114-18 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1991) (arguing that postmodernism has generated a politics "of micro-revolutionary practices" that fight against "monopolies of interpretation"). Steven Best and Douglas Kellner argue that numerous theorists associated with postmodernism have advocated various forms of local political action. For example, they note that postmodern theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have called for multiple local struggles against subordination. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 272-73. See generally Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (1985). They also claim that other theorists, such as Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Richard Rorty, have rejected "utopian visions of liberation, global politics, and attempts at large-scale transformation ... in favor of an emphasis on piecemeal reforms and local strategies." Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 272. Foucault, who has been a significant figure in the evolution of poverty law scholarship, is particularly notable for his depiction of power as an all-pervasive force that can be resisted by marginalized human subjects in small ways in the course of their day-to-day lives. See id. at 275. See generally Michel Foucault, Power (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 2000); Michel Foucault, Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980). Finally, Best and Kellner also highlight Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari as theorists who have adopted postmodern micropolitics. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 276. See generally Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1983). n180. See supra note 53. n181. See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 179, at 226-28 (arguing that, in an era of "corporate colonization," the new social movements, which emphasize local action, cannot serve as transformative social vehicles because the "main locus of new movements has been in civil society, outside of or peripheral to the routine elements of the political system, consistent with the postmodern emphasis on micro, localized, and dispersed zones of resistance"); see also Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West (1986). For a discussion of the process of globalization, and its impact on economic and political structures, see generally Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (1999); George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998); and Fredric Jameson, Taking on Globalization, New Left Rev., July-Aug. 2000, at 49.

### 1NC – Counter Culture Bomb

Decades of Counter Cultural Movements Proves Your Aff Fails to Create Change –Institutional Engagement is the Only Way to Alter Social Structure

Joseph Heath philosophy professor at the University of Toronto and Andrew Potter visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal 2004 *Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture* Pg 5-6

**In the** '60s, **the baby boomers declared their implacable opposition to "the system."** They renounced materialism and greed, rejected the discipline and uniformity of the McCarthy era, and set out to build a new world based on individual freedom. Wnat ever hap­pened to this project? **Forty years later, "the system" does not appear to have changed very much.** **If anything, consumer capital­ism has emerged from decades of countercultural rebellion much stronger than it was before.** If Debord thought that the world was saturated with advertising and media in the early '60s, what would he have made of the 21st century? In this book, we argue that **decades of countercultural rebellion have failed to change anything because the theory of society on which the countercultural idea rests is false. We do not live in the Matrix, nor do we live in the spectacle. The world that we live in is in fact much more prosaic.** It consists of billions of human beings, each pursuing some more or less plausible conception of the good, trying to cooperate with one another, and doing so with varying degrees of success. **There is no single, overarching system that integrates it all. The culture cannot be jammed because there** is **no such thing as "the culture" or "the system." There is only a hodge­podge of social institutions, most tentatively thrown together, which distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation in ways that sometimes we recognize to be just, but that are usually manifestly inequitable. In a world of this type, countercultural rebellion is not just unhelpful, it is positively counterproductive. Not only does it distract energy and effort away from the sort of initiatives that lead to concrete improvements in people's lives, but it encourages wholesale contempt for such incremental changes. According to the countercultural theory**, "the system" achieves order only through the repression of the individual. Pleasure is inherently anarchic, unruly, wild. To keep the workers under con­trol, the system must instill manufactured needs and mass-produced desires, which can in turn be satisfied within the framework of the technocratic order. Order is achieved, but at the expense of pro­moting widespread unhappiness, alienation and neurosis. **The solution must therefore lie in reclaiming our capacity for sponta­neous pleasure**—**through polymorphous perversity, or perform­ance art, or modern primitivism, or mind-expanding drugs**, or Whatever else turns your crank. In the countercultural analysis, simply having fun comes to be seen as the ultimate subversive act. Hedonism is transformed into a revolutionary doctrine. Is it any wonder then that this sort of countercultural rebellion has reinvigorated consumer capitalism? **It's time for a reality check. Having fun is not subversive, and it doesn't undermine any system**. In fact, **widespread hedonism makes it more difficult to organize social movements, and much more difficult to persuade anyone to make a sacrifice in the name of social justice**. In our view, what the progressive left needs to do is disentangle the concern over ques­tions of social justice from the countercultural critique—and to jet­tison the latter, while continuing to pursue the former. From the standpoint of social justice, **the** **big gains that have been achieved in our society over the past half-century have all come from measured reform within the system. The civil rights movement and the feminist movement have both achieved tan­gible gains** in the welfare of disadvantaged groups, while the social safety net provided by the welfare state has vastly improved the condition of all citizens. But **these gains have not been achieved by "unplugging" people from the web of illusions that governs their lives. They have been achieved through the laborious process of democratic political action—through people making arguments, conducting studies, assembling coalitions and legislating change**. We would like to see more of this. **Less fun perhaps, but potentially much more useful.**

### 1NC – Psychology Turn

The Call to Rethink Fails – By Framing the Problem as Psychological They Trap Resistance in an Endless Cycle of Paranoid Self-Indulgence That Perverts Political Strategy – Hippies Prove It

Joseph Heath philosophy professor at the University of Toronto and Andrew Potter visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal 2004 *Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture*

**The "politics of oppression"** bears some resemblance to the ' politics of exploitation." The difference, however, is that it **considers the roots of the injustice to be psychological**, not social. **Thus, the first imperative is not to change specific institutions, but rather to transform the consciousness of the oppressed.** (Hence the enormous popularity of "consciousness-raising" groups in the early feminist movement.) **Politics begins to resemble a twelve-step program.** The old-fashioned concern with wealth and poverty is now characterized as "superficial." Roszak, for example, argues that with the development of the counterculture, "revolution will be primarily therapeutic in character and not merely institu¬tional." What an extraordinary phrase: merely institutional! **This sort of talk was widespread.** Charles Reich, in The Greening of America, writes, "The revolution must be cultural. For culture controls the economic and political machine, not vice versa. T{? machinery turns out what it pleases and forces people to buy. But!1 the culture changes, the machine has no choice but to comply." >j| Why one found it exceptionable at all when the Beatles, in "Revolution,” claimed that instead of changing the "constitution," or any other such "institution," it would be better to "free your mind instead.'?! One can see here an implicit picture of how society works, with; **a relationship of hierarchical dependence between social institutions, the culture and**, finally **individual psychology** The latter two **are thought to determine the first.** So if you want to change the! economy you need to change the culture, and if you want to| change the culture, fundamentally you have to change people's consciousness. **This led to two fateful conclusions**. **First**, it suggested that cultural politics was more fundamental than the traditional politics of distributive justice. **Any act of nonconformity was thought to have important political consequences, even if it appeared to have nothing to do with anything that would be considered "political"** or "economic" in the traditional sense of the term. **Second**, and even more unhelpful, was the suggestion that **changing one's own consciousness was** more important than changing the culture (much less the political or economic system), j Nowadays, **this preoccupation with individual consciousness usually takes the form of self-help.** **But in the '60s, the primary consequence was a massive diversion of Utopian energies into the drug culture.** It seems hard to believe now, but **people at the time actually thought that widespread use of marijuana and LSD would solve all of society's problems: that it could affect geopolitics, eliminate war, cure poverty and create a world of "peace, love and understanding."** Many of Timothy Leary's experiments were aimed at "expanding consciousness" by undoing the effects of socialization, scrambling the "imprints" that individuals received when they were young. Yet it wasn't just self-styled gurus like Leary who bought into these ideas. Even a critical observer like Roszak was tempted by the following argument: "The 'psyche-delic revolution' then comes down to the simple syllogism: change prevailing mode of consciousness and you change the world; #iise of dope ex opera operato changes the prevailing mode of consciousness; therefore, universalize the use of dope and you change the world." **The idea that taking drugs might be revolutionary was of course forced by the existence of punitive drug laws. Countercultural revolutionaries saw an obvious logic to it all. Alcohol, which dulls and subdues the senses, is perfectly legal.** It's like soma, used to placate the working classes. As long as daddy gets his scotch after -Work, he can tolerate another day in his suburban hell. But marijuana and LSD, rather than dulling the senses, help to free the mind. Thus **they cannot be tolerated by "the system."** These drugs encourage nonconformity, and therefore pose too great a threat to the established order. **That's why The Man sends round the fuzz. to bust your stash.** Or, later, it's why Ronald Reagan felt the need to declare a "war on drugs." **And**, of course, **when repression fails there is always co-optation.** Thus, **pharmaceutical companies get in on the act, selling sanitized versions of the same drugs but without the subversive, mind-expanding properties.** So you get poppers and bennies, and soon you're in the Valley of the Dolls, another "treacherous parody of freedom and fulfillment." (To this day, people continue to describe the transformation of the United States into a "Prozac nation" as though it were a perversion or co-optation of the counterculture, as opposed to merely the logical extension of it.) **Underlying the countercultural analysis of the drug laws there was**, of course, **a preposterous interpretation of the effects of all these substances**, alcohol included. **The idea that marijuana liberates the mind is something that only someone who is stoned could believe. Anyone who isn't knows that marijuana users are about the most boring people on earth to talk to.** Furthermore, **the idea that alcohol is somehow less subversive than narcotics or psychedelics reveals a woeful ignorance of the history of alcohol. The claims that were made about LSD in the '60s are almost identical to the ones made for absinthe in the second half of the 19th century.** It is precisely because of its disruptive, antisocial effects that efforts were made to ban alcohol, particularly in the United States during Prohibition. **Yet during this time, no progressive group foolish enough to think that alcohol represented a positive force in society**, or that it was good for people. **Communists and anarchists didn't go around encouraging alcoholism among workers.** They could see that creating a more just society would require more, no' less, cooperative effort on the part of the broader public. And alcohol certainly didn't encourage that. **The hippies**, unfortunately, **had to learn this the hard way.**

### Juffer

Their Methodology is Misguided – Reliance on Culture as a Politically Subversive Tool Outside the System Plays into the Fetishization of Diversity Within the Corporate University - Your Aff Just Becomes Another Tool of Recruitment

Jane Juffer former director of the Latino/a Studies Initiative @ Penn State 2001 “The Limits of Culture Latino Studies, Diversity Management and the Corporate University” Nepantla: Views from South 2.2 [*quals continued*: Associate Professor of English @ Cornell]

A new set of possibilities—for some, an ominous set—confronts Latino cultural studies in the age of globalization, migration, and the corporatization of the university. Growing minority enrollments, led by Latinas/os,1 have prompted many colleges and universities to expand services and courses related to multiculturalism; administrators are reportedly worried they won’t be ready for the increasingly diverse student populations predicted for coming years. There are new commitments to expand access to higher education for Latinas/ os, often in conjunction with privxate monies. In June 2000, for example, President Bill Clinton announced the formation of the 2010 Alliance, a partnership of corporate, foundation, and community leaders that will seek to double the number of Latino students who graduate from college over the next ten years. In describing the program, Clinton was careful to not lay the blame for low retention rates on Latino students but rather on structural questions of access (Kiviat 2000, A39). In September 1999, Bill and Melinda Gates pledged to spend $1 billion over twenty years to send twenty thousand low-income minority students to college; the Hispanic Scholarship Fund will help administer the program. Unfortunately, these commitments come with an agenda that seems antithetical to the activist roots of Latino studies: the articulation At the summer 2000 meeting of the National Governors Association held at Pennsylvania State University, Alan Greenspan (2000), chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, credited the “free flow” of information between universities, business, and government for U.S. economic growth: If we are to remain pre-eminent in transforming knowledge into economic value, the U.S. system of higher education must remain the world’s leader in generating scientific and technological breakthroughs and in preparing workers to meet the evolving demands for skilled labor. . . . Ina global environment in which prospects for economic growth now depend importantly on a country’s capacity to develop and apply new technologies, our universities are envied around the world. The payoffs—in terms of the flow of expertise, new products and startup companies, for example—have been impressive. Perhaps the most frequently cited measures of our success have been the emergence of significant centers of commercial innovation and entrepreneurship where creative ideas flow freely between local academic scholars and those in industry. In the 11 July 2000 edition of the Penn StateNewswire, the university used the conference, held at its Research Park, to publicize its own status as the “number 2 university in the country in industry-sponsored research.” As Bill Readings argued in his 1996 The University in Ruins, the decline of the nation-state and the ascendancy of the transnational corporation have transformed the university’s mission from one of citizen production for the nation-state to worker production for the global economy. Indeed, we have reached the rather unusual historical moment when big business joins forces with universities to defend affirmative action in the interest of developing a diverse and well-trained workforce. Corporate support figured significantly in the University of Michigan’s recent court victory in a battle over its affirmative action admissions policies; a federal judge ruled in favor of the policies and cited, among other things, the evidence put forth by the university and corporations about the benefits of diversity programs. Twenty Fortune 500 companies signed a brief filed on the university’s behalf, and General Motors submitted a separate supporting brief. The brief by the twenty companies argues that “higher education is so vital to the companies’ efforts ‘to hire and maintain a diverse work force,’and to employ people ‘who have been educated in a diverse environment,’that the government has a compelling interest in allowing public colleges to continue using affirmative action in admissions” (Schmidt 2000c, A22). Multiculturalism, within which Latino studies now often finds its financial if not its philosophical legitimation, has become diversity management for a newly compliant university population.As the University of Indiana’s Department of Human Resources has said on its Website, “diversity” is “a customer service issue.” Critics including Readings (1996), Slavoj Žižek (1997), Masao Miyoshi (2000), Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt (1999),Wahneem aLubiano (1996),HenryGiroux (1999),andStanley Aronowitz (2000), among others, have documented the extent to which corporate management tactics and corporate contracts have come to dominate many universities; some of these critics have focused on the co-optation of multiculturalism within this corporate shift. Žižek (1997, 46), in one of the most virulent condemnations, proclaims that “the problematic of multiculturalism—the hybrid coexistence of diverse cultural life-worlds—which imposes itself today is the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system.” In fact, it has perhaps become more common to see critiques of multiculturalism from the Left than from the Right (acknowledging the reductiveness but ongoing purchase of those categories).3

### Globalization Good

#### Weigh consequences—moral absolutism *reproduces evil*.

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Capitalism is key to the formation of successful space programs

Martin 10 (Robert, Amerika, June 21, <http://www.amerika.org/politics/centrifuge-capitalism/>, accessed: 3 July 2011)

Centralization and capitalism are necessary for any intelligent civilization, yet in excess drains the base population of any sustenance whatsoever, leaving them unemployed, homeless and starving at worst. The answer to this event is not a swing on the pendulum all the way onto total equality fisted socialism out on a plate for everyone who isn’t rich, that would be devastating for organization, but is a more natural ecosystem type of financing of a near-barter economics with different values and currencies for localized entities and more buoyant monetary for inter-localities – only monetizing where absolutely necessary. Without the higher economics that goes beyond small barter communities, there could be no space programs, or planetary defences providing the technology or the organization necessary to survive extinction events or fund a military etc, it’s critical for the structure of the superorganism – yet too much and some individuals inside of it become so padded from outside reality that they completely ignore the world around them.

#### Extinction – we have to go to space

Garan 10 – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” <http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon>)

Resources and Other Benefits: Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet. Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration. The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

#### It’s sustainable—no political crises and self correcting

Stelzer 9 Irwin Stelzer is a business adviser and director of economic policy studies at the Hudson Institute, “Death of capitalism exaggerated,” http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26174260-5013479,00.html

A FUNNY thing happened on the way to the collapse of market capitalism in the face of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It didn't. Indeed, in Germany voters relieved Chancellor Angela Merkel of the necessity of cohabiting with a left-wing party, allowing her to form a coalition with a party favouring lower taxes and free markets. And in Pittsburgh leaders representing more than 90 per cent of the world's GDP convened to figure out how to make markets work better, rather than to hoist the red flag. The workers are to be relieved, not of their chains but of credit-card terms that are excessively onerous, and helped to retain their private property - their homes. All of this is contrary to expectations. The communist spectre that Karl Marx confidently predicted would be haunting Europe is instead haunting Europe's left-wing parties, with even Vladimir Putin seeking to attract investment by re-privatising the firms he snatched. Which raises an interesting question: why haven't the economic turmoil and rising unemployment led workers to the barricades, instead of to their bankers to renegotiate their mortgages? It might be because Spain's leftish government has proved less able to cope with economic collapse than countries with more centrist governments. Or because Britain, with a leftish government, is now the sick man of Europe, its financial sector in intensive care, its recovery likely to be the slowest in Europe, its prime credit rating threatened. Or it might be because left-wing trade unions, greedily demanding their public-sector members be exempted from the pain they want others to share, have lost their credibility and ability to lead a leftward lurch. All of those factors contribute to the unexpected strength of the Right in a world in which a record number of families are being tossed out of their homes, and jobs have been disappearing by the million. But even more important in promoting reform over revolution are three factors: the existence of democratic institutions; the condition of the unemployed; and the set of policies developed to cope with the recession. Democratic institutions give the aggrieved an outlet for their discontent, and hope they can change conditions they deem unsatisfactory. Don't like the way George W. Bush has skewed income distribution? Toss the Republicans out and elect a man who promises to tax the rich more heavily. Don't like Gordon Brown's tax increases? Toss him out and hope the Tories mean it when they promise at least to try to lower taxes. Result: angry voters but no rioters, unless one counts the nutters who break windows at McDonald's or storm banks in the City. Contrast that with China, where the disaffected have no choice but to take to the streets. Result: an estimated 10,000 riots this year protesting against job losses, arbitrary taxes and corruption. A second factor explaining the Left's inability to profit from economic suffering is capitalism's ability to adapt, demonstrated in the Great Depression of the 1930s. While a gaggle of bankers and fiscal conservatives held out for the status quo, Franklin D. Roosevelt and his experimenters began to weave a social safety net. In Britain, William Beveridge produced a report setting the stage for a similar, indeed stronger, net. Continental countries recovering from World War II did the same. So unemployment no longer dooms a worker to close-to-starvation. Yes, civic institutions were able to soften the blow for the unemployed before the safety net was put in place, but they could not cope with pervasive protracted lay-offs. Also, during this and other recessions, when prices for many items are coming down, the real living standard of those in work actually improves. In the US, somewhere between 85 per cent and 90 per cent of workers have kept their jobs, and now see their living costs declining as rents and other prices come down. So the impetus to take to the streets is limited. Then there are the steps taken by capitalist governments to limit the depth and duration of the downturn. As the economies of most of the big industrial countries imploded, policy went through two phases. The first was triage - do what is necessary to prevent the financial system from collapse. Spend. Guarantee deposits to prevent runs on banks and money funds, bail out big banks, force relatively healthier institutions to take over sicker ones, mix all of this with rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers - the populist spoonful of sugar that made the bailouts go down with the voters - and stop the rot. Meanwhile, have the central banks dust off their dog-eared copies of Bagehot and inject lots of liquidity by whatever means comes to mind. John Maynard Keynes, meet Milton Friedman for a cordial handshake. Then came more permanent reform, another round of adapting capitalism to new realities, in this case the malfunctioning of the financial markets. Even Barack Obama's left-wing administration decided not to scupper the markets but instead to develop rules to relate bankers' pay more closely to long-term performance; to reduce the chance of implosions by increasing the capital banks must hold, cutting their profits and dividends, but leaving them in private hands; and to channel most stimulus spending through private-sector companies. This leaves the anti-market crowd little room for manoeuvre as voters seem satisfied with the changes to make capitalism and markets work better and more equitably. At least so far. There are exceptions. Australia moved a bit to the left in the last election, but more out of unhappiness with a tired incumbent's environmental and foreign policy. Americans chose Obama, but he had promised to govern from the centre before swinging left. And for all his rhetorical attacks on greedy bankers and other malefactors of great wealth, he sticks to reform of markets rather than their replacement, with healthcare a possible exception. Even in these countries, so far, so good for reformed capitalism. No substitutes accepted.

#### They say the lead to the opposition of heg- heg is good and solves conflict escalation and great power war

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents theemergenceof a far more dangerous globalsecurity environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it theleverage to restrain partners fromtakingprovocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter stateswith aspirations to regional hegemonyfrom contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens thebalefuleffects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasingmilitary outlays. 74 The result mightbe a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely toobtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior.Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions.We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal ofthe American pacifier will yieldeither a competitive regionalmultipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing,crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, andthe like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regionalproxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usuallycarried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rationalleaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclearproliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will nothave truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States willhave toplay a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromiseits capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S.**security** commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses theunderlyinglogic ofthedeep engagementstrategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventingthe emergence ofa hothouse atmosphere forgrowingnew military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Globalization solves poverty and repression

**Chen, Minnesota law school professor, 2000**

(Jim, “ESSAY: PAX MERCATORIA: GLOBALIZATION AS A SECOND CHANCE AT "PEACE FOR OUR TIME”, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. 217, lexis)

The antiglobalization movement has made some extraordinary claims. Let us transplant a precept of natural science into this social realm: n177 extraordinary claims demand extraordinary proof. n178 From Seattle to Prague, protesters have argued that the organs of international economic law conspire with multinational corporations to sap national and local governments of legitimate power, to destabilize global security, and to poison workplaces as well as ecosystems. n179 That case has not met even the most generous standard of proof. The antiglobalization movement has failed to refute the following: Dramatic improvements in welfare at every wealth and income [\*246] level. n180 Since 1820 global wealth has expanded tenfold, thanks largely to technological advances and the erosion of barriers to trade. n181 The world economic order, simply put, is lifting people out of poverty. According to the World Bank, the percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty fell from 28.3 to 23.4% between 1987 and 1998. n182 (The World Bank defines extreme and absolute poverty according to "reference lines set at $ 1 and $ 2 per day" in 1993 terms, adjusted for "the relative purchasing power of currencies across countries.") n183 A more optimistic study has concluded that "the share of the world's population earning less than US$ 2 per day shrank by more than half" between 1980 and 1990, "from 34 to 16.6 percent." n184 In concrete terms, "economic growth associated with globalization" over the course of that decade helped lift 1.4 billion people out of absolute poverty. n185 Whatever its precise magnitude, this improvement in global welfare has taken place because of, not in spite of, flourishing world trade. n186 The meaning of American victory in the Cold War. The liberal democracies of the north Atlantic alliance decisively defeated their primary political rivals in the Eastern bloc. Capitalism coupled with generous civil liberties crushed central planning coupled with dictatorship of the proletariat. "America, so the world supposes, won the Cold War." n187 And the world is right. The true nature of the environmental crisis. The most serious environmental problems involve "the depletion and destruction of the global commons." n188 Climate change, ozone depletion, [\*247] and the loss of species, habitats, and biodiversity are today's top environmental priorities. n189 None can be solved without substantial economic development and intense international cooperation. The systematic degradation of the biosphere respects no political boundaries. Worse, it is exacerbated by poverty. Of the myriad environmental problems in this mutually dependent world, "persistent poverty may turn out to be the most aggravating and destructive." n190 We must remember "above all else" that "human degradation and deprivation ... constitute the greatest threat not only to national, regional, and world security, but to essential life-supporting ecological systems." n191 The enhancement of individual liberty through globalization. By dislodging local tyrants and ideologies, globalization has minimized the sort of personal abuse that too often seems endemic to one place, one population. n192 The twenty-first century will witness "people voting with their feet to escape from some village elder's idea of how to live, or some London School of Economics graduate's idea of protecting Indian folkways." n193 This changing social reality will undermine the conventional assumption that capital is mobile but labor is immobile. Generations of scholarship on trade and international relations hang in the balance. At the very least we will have to recalibrate existing race-to-the-bottom models and their sensitivity to "giant sucking sounds." [\*248] Nor has localism propounded plausible solutions to challenges such as food security, n194 AIDS and other epidemiological crises, and barriers to full equality for women and children. n195 The localist package of autarky, retaliatory protectionism, and isolationism would be catastrophic. It really is a shame that Ralph Nader will probably not be named "the first U.S. ambassador to North Korea," where he could "get a real taste of what a country that actually follows [his] insane economic philosophy - high protectionism, economic autarky, anti-markets, antiglobalization, anti-multinationals - is like for the people who live there." n196 The policies preferred by the protesters at Seattle and Prague guarantee penury for most, security for some, and power for an unjustly privileged few. That way runs anew the road to serfdom. n197

# 2NC

### 2NC Extension – Ethics DAs Don’t Apply

#### And Risk of Offense Doesn’t Disprove Our Interpretation – IT Just Means There is Predictable Critical Literature That They Can Run on the Neg

ALFRED C. SNIDER Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics at the University of Vermont 1984 Ethics in Academic Debate The National Forensic Journal, II (Fall 1984), pp. 119-134

There are a number of reasons why the ethics of a game situation matches up well with the ethics of an academic debate situation. Duke, for example, has stated that a game is well suited to handling ethical concerns if it has a neutral, non-manipulative design.21 Certainly the game of debate briefly outlined in the works men- tioned earlier attempts to meet this criteria, especially by stressing the need for equality of opportunity among players. Schelling has observed that a game is well suited for handling ethical issues if it involves direct consequences of ethical choices.22 Certainly in academic debate, the possibility of losing a ballot on an ethical issue (such as proven fabrication of evidence) does provide the needed consequences. Valavanis has posited that ethical issues are explored when the welfare of others is inter-related.23 Certainly in an academic debate, players have the welfare of their partners and the school to think of, as well as the welfare of an opponent against whom they might violate ethical standards in competition.¶ This does not mean that there will be no ethical problems in the game of debate, nor does it mean that ethical difficulties can be defined outside of actual play. As Duke notes, "new ethical problems may emerge in the use of a game."24 When ethical problems do develop, it is best to let the operator (in this case, the judge) merely observe how ethical disputes are played out in the round. In the best spirit of a liberal education, the debaters should decide by their argument. Duke notes that the "simplest, most straightforward rule is that the operator should blend into the woodwork at the earliest possible moment and let the game proceed with a minimum of operator intervention."25 Thus, in a debate, ethical disputes are open to argument.¶ A couple of issues need to be raised in pre-emption to possible arguments against the position that gaming can operate as a way to approach ethics within academic debate. One would be that ethics is necessarily connected with values, and values are very rarely discussed in a debate context. It seems less than sage to argue that values are EVER excluded from intellectual concerns. As Bremer notes, intellectual curiosity probably cannot exist without moral concern.26 Certainly issues such as politics and economics, often discussed in debates, have important ethical components. As Schelling has noted, it is not possible to abstract "ethical man" as separate from "economic man" and "rational man."27 These concepts are related. Academic debate provides a fertile area for a discussion of ethics, values, and morals. Another objection may be that not all will be willing to play the game ethically. Of course, this is true. However, the implication must not be that this demonstrates that gaming is a FAILURE at studying ethics, but means that gaming is a fertile area for ethical study BECAUSE not all will obey the same set of applied ethical standards. As Schelling notes, when we develop a sort of "social contract" between players to play the game "ethically," we "must take as a premise that not everybody will sign the contract."28¶ Ethical concerns are prevalent in academic debate, both in a discussion of the issues implied by the topics, and by the practices which emerge in academic debates. Gaming provides not an answer, but a feasible methodology for handling the study of such ethical disputes.

### AT Role of the Ballot

#### 1. Their role of the ballot argument is circular – all of our framework arguments are impact turns to trying to politicize debate and make it anything more than a game about what the usfg should do

 a. Competition turn – trying to accomplish political goals within a debate ground just creates backlash against whatever you’re trying to accomplish, debaters care about winning – telling opponents they should lose at the altar of your political movement just causes alienation and resentment instead of trying to make the ballot mean something, if you want to change the activity do so outside of an actual debate round,

Atchison and Panetta 9– \*Director of Debate at Trinity University and \*\*Director of Debate at the University of Georgia (Jarrod, and Edward, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed., 2009, p. 317-334)

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the “community” portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community.

However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because their director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because their coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.

From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

### 2NC AT: We Meet Your Framework

#### By Criticizing the Resolution on the Affirmative, Their Framework Disincentives Researching the Resolution – This Short Circuits the Positive Influences of Deliberation

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

More generally, external incentives can only solve the incentive problem when (1) such incentives have sufficient magnitude and (2) they can feasibly depend on whether a participant reveals the private information that she should have. Our two examples suggest that the latter requirement can be challenging. While the speculation on the positive effects of repetition on sincere speech has some bite, turning the speculation into an argument requires precisely the kind of detailed analysis of incentives that formal theorists have been engaging in.15 Proceeding with just such an analysis, Morris (2001) considers a policy-maker seeking advice from an advisor on a policy decision and shows that the shadow of the future can actually create incentives for dishonesty. The following motivating example captures the intuition:¶ Consider the plight of an informed social scientist advising an uninformed policy maker on the merits of affirmative action by race. If the social scientist were racist, she would oppose affirmative action. In fact she is not racist, but she has come to the conclusion that affirmative action is an ill-conceived policy to address racism. The policy maker is not racist, but since he believes that there is a high probability that the social scientist is not racist, he would take an anti-affirmative action recommendation seriously and adjust government policy accordingly. But an anti-affirmative action recommendation would increase the probability that the policy maker believes the social scientist to be racist. If the social scientist is sufficiently concerned about being perceived to be racist, she will have an incentive to lie and recommend affirmative action. But this being the case, she would not be believed even if she sincerely believed in affirmative action and recommended it. Either way, the social scientist is socially valuable information is lost (p. 231-232). The logic behind this example is particularly damaging to the reputational argument because it is precisely the advisor is concern for her reputation in the eyes of the policy-maker that furnishes her with an incentive to lie, even though both players, in fact, have the same preferences. In sharp contrast to the case in which participants can observe when a speaker has been dishonest and punish her, if such observations are not possible, reputational concerns can make matters worse.

#### Points of Stasis Are Critical to the Game

Anthony Kelly lecturer at the University of Southampton Research & Graduate School of Education 2003 “Introduction” Decision Making using Game Theory Cambridge University Press

Game theory represents an abstract model of decision-making, not the social reality of decision-making itself. Therefore, while game theory ensures that a result follows logically from a model, it cannot ensure that the result itself represents reality, except in so far as the model is an accurate one. To describe this model accurately requires practitioners to share a common language, which, to the uninitiated, might seem excessively technical. This is unavoidable. Since game theory represents the interface of mathematics and management, it must of necessity adopt a terminology that is familiar to both.

### 2NC Fairness Comes First

#### Actual surveys/studies support this

Thomas Preston, Summer 2003. Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” <http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>.

The study involved forty-three students and nine critics who participated in a parliamentary debate tournament where no topic was assigned for the fourth round debates. True to the idea of openness, no rules regarding the topic were announced; no topic, or written instructions other than time limits and judging instruction, were provided. In this spirit, the participants first provided anecdotal reactions to the no-topic debate, so that the data from this study could emerge from discussion. Second, respondents provided demographic data so that patterns could be compared along three dimensions. These dimensions, the independent variables for the student portion of the study, involved three items: 1) level of debate experience; 2) whether NPDA was the only format of parliamentary debate the students had experienced; and 3) whether students had participated in NDT or CEDA policy debate. Third, the questions were to determine how students rated the debates based on criteria for good debate-educational value, clash, and a fair division of ground. Students were also asked two general questions: whether they would try the no-topic debate again, and whether they liked the no-topic round. These questions constituted the dependent variables for the student study. Because the sample was small, descriptive statistical data were gathered from critics. Taking into account the experience of the critics, additional questions concerning items such as whether no-topic debating deepened discussion. Both students and critics were asked which side they thought the no-topic approach favored, and the students with NDT/ CEDA policy debating experience were asked if a no-topic debating season would be good for policy debate.For the objective items, critics and students were asked to circle a number between 1 and 7 to indicate the strength of reaction to each item (Appendix I and Appendix II). In scoring responses, the most favorable rating received the highest score of seven and the least favorable rating a score of one. In some instances, values that were circled on the sheet were reversed such that the most favorable reaction to that category received the higher score. Frequency distributions and statistics were then tabulated for each question, and the anecdotal remarks were tabulated. For the student empirical data, t-tests were conducted to determine whether overall debate experience, NPDA experience, or policy experience affected how the students reacted to an item. As a test for significance, p was set to less than or equal to .05. Finally, of the 43 responses, 35, or 81.4 per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other. Of those responses, 32 (91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government. Three (8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.

#### Makes debate impossible

Thomas Preston, Summer 2003. Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” <http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>.

For the overall student data, each the mean of each item was slightly below 4.0, but mostly, the kurtosis figures were negative, and the standard deviations high, indicating a bipolar response to each question. The frequency tables bear out strong negative reactions, but a number of positive reactions which tended to be less strong. On the one hand, a substantial number of students and critics felt very strongly that the experience was negative, with the mode=l for each item on the survey; however, on others, a substantial number of respondents rated aspects of the experience at 4 and above. The educational value had the highest central tendencies (mean=3.65, median=4.0, and mode=1.0), whereas the question over whether the students liked the experience was the lowest (mean=3.19, median=3.0, mode=1.0). Although there was a weak positive pole to the responses, those who had NDT/CEDA experience strongly opposed the idea of a no-topic year of debating in those organizations (mean=2.77, median =1.00, mode=1.00). cont. Reduced to absurdity, the notion of no rules for a debate tournament would result in chaos, bringing up an infinite regress into whether or not chaos is a good thing! At least on the surface, the results of this particular study would seem to discourage repeating this experiment as conducted for the present study. A number of participants may not want to return to the tournament because of the confusion and perceived lack of educational value. However, an exact representation and t-tests between results could help not only assess the validity and reliability of the instrument, but whether attitudes and perceptions have changed toward no-topic debating. Therefore, whereas Option III may seem to be out of the questions, benefits can still be gained from it in terms of studying the evolution of parliamentary debate form.

### Games Theory = Debate

#### You Should Prioritize Our Competition Impacts First – Games Theory Accounts for the Role of the Resolution as a Starting Point, The Debate as a Process, and The Ballot as a Tool That Determines a Winner and a Loser

Dimitri Landa and Adam Meirowitz Assistant Professors of Department of Politics, New York University 2009 Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy www.princeton.edu/~ameirowi/GTDDfinal032207.pdf

The game-theoretic approach involves a three-step process. The first step defines a game, which captures (a) the relevant choices that are understood to be available to the players (in models of deliberation, typically, what messages, if any, could be sent, and what decisions could be made after the exchange of messages), (b) what the players know about those choices, about each other, and about the deliberative interaction to which they are a party, and finally, (c) how attractive they would perceive the consequences of those choices to be if they knew everything that there was to know about them. The second step specifies a solution concept, which embodies a set of assumptions about the general behavioral agency ascribed to the players in the model. Given the first two steps, the third step is logically entailed: through well-defined techniques of analysis, one can generate predictions about what types of behavior, with respect to the particular choices analyzed in the model, are and are not mutually consistent - that is, are or are not supportable by equilibria of the specified game. The key question that motivates the game-theoretic analysis is how policy selection is related to private information and preferences when participants engage in equilibrium behavior.

# 1NR

### Micropolitics

Micro-politics – even when politically potent – is doomed to fail and cede politics.

Dery ‘96

Mark Dery is an American author, lecturer and cultural critic. He taught media criticism and literary journalism in the Department of Journalism at New York University.In January 2000, he was appointed Chancellor's Distinguished Fellow at the University of California, Irvine – BUILDING A PROGRESSIVE, PRAGMATIC FUTURISM AN E-MAIL INTERVIEW WITH MARK DERY BY GEERT LOVINK– it is regarding his book Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End of the Century – the interview is available at: http://www.thing.desk.nl/bilwet/TXT/dery.txt.

Of course, techno-bricoleurs like Mark Pauline of Survival Research Laboratories better embody what you probably mean by "the myth of subversion." The rogue technologist who wages guerrilla war on the military-industrial complex with robots made out of appropriated, re-animated techno-trash has been enshrined, through William Gibson characters like Slick Henry in \_Mona Lisa Overdrive\_, in the cyberpunk pantheon, alongside the outlaw hacker. The problem with SRL-inspired fantasies of a techno-revolution by garbage pail kids is that they're underwritten by an incongruously Weathermen-esque faith in the power of a well-placed bomb to "strike at the heart of the state," as the Red Brigades put it. Obviously, it's a keystone assumption of postmodern analyses of the nonlinear dynamics of power, from Debord's \_Society of the Spectacle\_ to the Critical Art Ensemble's \_Electronic Disturbance\_, that power has etherealized---that control controls (to use a William S. Burroughsian turn of phrase) less by corporal punishment than by colonizing the mass imagination with media fictions that manufacture consent. Pauline is all too aware of this; SRL's theater of operations is founded on the assumption that even ritualized resistance to technocratic power produces tangible effects, if only in the minds of audience members. My critique of SRL in \_Escape Velocity\_ ends with Pauline saying, "I believe in the political potency of the symbolic gesture"---a quote that could easily do double duty as the battle cry of the cultural politics theorized by Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige, and their ilk. Unfortunately, symbolic resistance is just that: symbolic. It cedes territory in the larger cultural arena in the name of micropolitical resistance (an Achilles Heel it shares with virtual communitarianism, incidentally) and unwittingly lends itself to easy appropriation by consumer capitalism, which guts, skins, stuffs, and mounts "symbolic gestures," *no matter how politically potent,* with alarming speed. To invert Gibson's cyberpunk shibboleth, the strip mall finds its own uses for things, too. Finally, pockets of resistance that can't be malled beyond recognition may be allowed to function as petri dishes, culturing strange new memes in the consumer capitalist equivalent of a vaccine against more virulent political infestations. As Andrew Ross notes in \_Strange Weather\_, the cyberdelic counterculture championed by \_Mondo 2000\_, like the illicit enclave of Chiba City's Ninsei in \_Neuromancer\_, serves as an "experimental sounding board for legitimate industrial developers." Which brings us full circle to \_Wired\_, and its role as a cultural airlock for cyberlumpen in transit to Microserfdom. As political tactics these rituals of resistance---"myths of subversion," to use your term--- stand in relation to the raw power of nation-states and the multinational megaconglomerates fast rendering them obsolete as the Japanese stratagem of trying to start forest fires in the U.S. with incendiary devices made of paper and bamboo, floated over on the jet stream, stood in relation to the American atom bombs simultaneously falling on Japan.

( ) Micro-politics fails and is comparatively-worse than macro-politics

Cummings & Eagly ‘1

Scott L. Cummings – Staff Attorney, Community Development Project, Public Counsel Law Center, Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1996. Ingrid V. Eagly – Coordinating Attorney, Immigrant Domestic Violence Project, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), Los Angeles, California. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1995. UCLA Law Review – February, 2001 – lexis, lawrev section.

The law and organizing model privileges local organizing as the centerpiece of social change practice. Relying significantly on postmodern [\*485] conceptions of political action, n178 which have emphasized small-scale resistance against subordination, n179 law and organizing proponents have viewed organizing as capable of fostering the type of local grassroots participation that leads to community empowerment. n180 Yet, while the ideal of local action has appealed to progressive scholars and activists, it has also been the subject of criticism by those who contend that, as a political strategy, it fails [\*486] to offer a coherent challenge to the larger institutional structures that produce poverty and inequality. Critics of localism have expressed concern about measuring the success of political action by an empowerment standard and have wondered whether local, neighborhood-based efforts can ultimately generate a viable progressive social movement. Carl Boggs, for example, has questioned the effectiveness of local organizing in light of the increasing consolidation of corporate power and the growing importance of global economic and political decision-making structures. n181 He argues that "one of the great ironies of the past two decades is that large-scale, macro, and global issues are increasingly met with local, often individual or privatized, outlooks and "solutions' which is yet another testament to political futility." n182 Handler has put forth a similar critique of the "new social movements," which he describes as "the archetypal form of postmodern politics - grass roots, protest from below, solidarity, collective identity, affective processes - all in the struggle against the established order outside the "normal' channels." n183 Handler suggests that these grassroots initiatives lack a comprehensive alternative social vision, which ultimately prevents them from developing institutional structures and challenging the hegemony of liberal capitalism. n184 Community development scholars have leveled similar critiques against localism, arguing that social change strategies focused on geographically discrete communities cannot sufficiently address the problems of racial isolation and poverty concentration that are generated by broader regional dynamics. n185 Community organizers [\*487] have also voiced concerns about the limitations of place-based neighborhood action strategies. n186 These criticisms raise legitimate questions about the efficacy of local organizing movements. How can local victories be leveraged into systemic, long-term changes in political and economic structures? How can local efforts be forged into a broader social movement? Although much attention has been focused on the benefits that grassroots organizing has produced for low-income communities, scholars and practitioners must begin to think more expansively about how community-based action can be linked to large-scale reform. \*\*\*\*relevant foot notes start here – they’re from the paragraph we quote\*\*\*\* n179. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 276 (stating that there has been a movement "from a macropolitics that focused on changing the structure of the economy and state to a micropolitics that aims to overturn power and hierarchy in specific institutions and to liberate emotional, libidinal, and creative energies repressed by the reality principle of bourgeois society"); Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere 213 (2000) (arguing that postmodernism is "oriented mainly toward the micro politics of everyday life" and "tends to dismiss in toto the realm of macro politics *and with it an indispensable locus of any large-scale project of social transformation"*); Boaventura da Sousa Santos, The Post Modern Transition: Law in Politics, in The Fate of Law 79, 114-18 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 1991) (arguing that postmodernism has generated a politics "of micro-revolutionary practices" that fight against "monopolies of interpretation"). Steven Best and Douglas Kellner argue that numerous theorists associated with postmodernism have advocated various forms of local political action. For example, they note that postmodern theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have called for multiple local struggles against subordination. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 272-73. See generally Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (1985). They also claim that other theorists, such as Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Richard Rorty, have rejected "utopian visions of liberation, global politics, and attempts at large-scale transformation ... in favor of an emphasis on piecemeal reforms and local strategies." Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 272. Foucault, who has been a significant figure in the evolution of poverty law scholarship, is particularly notable for his depiction of power as an all-pervasive force that can be resisted by marginalized human subjects in small ways in the course of their day-to-day lives. See id. at 275. See generally Michel Foucault, Power (Robert Hurley et al. trans., 2000); Michel Foucault, Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980). Finally, Best and Kellner also highlight Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari as theorists who have adopted postmodern micropolitics. See Best & Kellner, The Postmodern Turn, supra note 49, at 276. See generally Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1983). n180. See supra note 53. n181. See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 179, at 226-28 (arguing that, in an era of "corporate colonization," the new social movements, which emphasize local action, cannot serve as transformative social vehicles because the "main locus of new movements has been in civil society, outside of or peripheral to the routine elements of the political system, consistent with the postmodern emphasis on micro, localized, and dispersed zones of resistance"); see also Carl Boggs, Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West (1986). For a discussion of the process of globalization, and its impact on economic and political structures, see generally Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (1999); George Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism (1998); and Fredric Jameson, Taking on Globalization, New Left Rev., July-Aug. 2000, at 49.

### Psychology

### 2NC – Psychology Turn\*

Even if Your Politics Are Effective Failure to Paint a Viable Alternative Means You Cant Prevent Perversion

Joseph Heath philosophy professor at the University of Toronto and Andrew Potter visiting fellow at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique at the Université de Montréal 2004 *Nation of rebels: why counterculture became consumer culture*

It should be clear by now just how modest the Marxian critique of society was when compared to the countercultural critique. Fun­damentally, what bothered Marx about capitalism was simply that the people who did all the work were desperately poor while the wealthy sat around and contributed nothing. He was concerned in other words, about exploitation. This exploitation was pio duced, he thought, by the prevailing set of economic institutions, in particular by the system of private property. It could therefore be corrected simply by eliminating, or rather reforming, these spe­cific institutions. So the communist movement had fairly clear political objectives—to abolish private property and establish common ownership of the means of production. **The countercultural critique**, on the other hand, **is so vast and all-encompassing that it is difficult to imagine what could possibly count as "fixing things."** What limits our freedom, according to this view, is not some specific set of institutions, but rather the exist­ence of institutions in general. **This is why the entire culture must be rejected.** The '60s icon Abbie Hoffman contemptuously dis­missed "political revolution" on the grounds that politics merely "breeds organizers." Cultural revolution, on the other hand, "cre­ates outlaws." **This certainly makes cultural revolution sound more exciting.** But we must keep in mind that the goal of all this is not to provide entertainment for intellectuals, it is to effect some fej 0f an improvement in society. Being an outlaw is in many ji s parasitic upon the existence of an organized society. **What if everyone became an outlaw? What does a society with no institutions, no rules and no regulations look like?** **'Countercultural theorists have traditionally been quite evasive when comes to answering this question. The standard dodge was to say that there is "no blueprint for a free society," or that because freeing ourselves from the culture requires completely transforming our consciousness, we are unable to predict what the future society will look like.** Michel Foucault was the master of such eva­sions. Another option was simply to romanticize rebellion and resistance for its own sake. **Resistance to mainstream society was often seen as therapeutic for the individual**, and promoted on those grounds. The goal of improving conditions in society at large, or of promoting social justice, receded from view. In this way, **the concern for social justice became redirected and absorbed into an increasingly narcissistic preoccupation with personal spiri­tual growth and well-being.**

### Util

#### Voting aff doesn’t necessitate absolute utilitarianism – there is a high threshold past which we should compromise morals to avoid catastrophic consequences

Moore – law prof, U San Diego – ‘97

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing Blame, p. 719-722

Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the ‘whatever the consequences’ aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my non­consequentialist views on morality, I cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is sur­rounded and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark­ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them­selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case’24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a sea­man who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider Bernard Williams’s example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to ‘sink or swim’ together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccupation with your own ‘virtue’—that is, the ‘virtue’ you could have if the world were ideal and did not pre­sent you with such awful choices—if you choose to allow the greater number to perish. In such cases, I prefer Sartre’s version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.’26One should feel guilty **in such cases,** but it is nobler to undertake such guilt than to shut one’s eyes to the horrendous consequences of not acting. I thus have some sympathy for the Landau Commission’s conclusion that ‘actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a bomb about to explode in a building full of people’. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have the consent of all concerned to ‘sink or swim’ together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams’s villagers, the occupants of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the ter­rorist group) be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like my variation of the Talmudic example than the original. Many think that the agent-relative view just sketched, allowing as it does consequences to override moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collapses into a consequen­tialist morality after all. Glanville Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence of necessity, recognizes the agent-relative view that ‘certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences’ and that ‘a good end never justifies bad means’. Williams nonetheless concludes that ‘in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results’. Williams reaches this conclusion because, as Williams sees it, the agent-relative slogans just quoted reduce to the claim ‘that we ought to do what is right regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious’. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of agent-relative views into consequentialism just because morality’s norms can be over­ridden by horrendous consequences.13’ A consequentialist is com­mitted by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the torture of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here modified, is not com­mitted to this proposition. To justify torturing one innocent person requires that there be horrendous consequences attached to not tor­turing that person—the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there is a very high threshold of bad consequences that must be threatened before something as awful as torturing an innocent per­son can be justified. Almost all real-life decisions a GSS interroga­tor will face—and perhaps all decisions—will not reach that threshold of horrendous consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold, the agent-relative view just sketched will operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on tor­turing the innocent.

#### Risk Analysis solves VTL

Langford 3 (Ian, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia and University College London, AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO RISK PERCEPTION)

In contemporary western societies, asking questions such as “Why do we live?” and “What is the meaning of life?” are often seen as symbols of weakness, depression, self indulgence or an inability to simply get on with life. Yet, as Camus stated, these are the most urgent questions of all, and we are all beings seeking meaning, in whatever form (Heidegger, 1966). Life in technologically- oriented Western societies often provides comfort, excitement and stimulus, but fails to provide meaning (Giddens, 1991). On an individual level, the psychiatrist Carl Jung (1966) noted that approximately one-third of all his patients were suffering not from a specific neurosis, but the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives. Viktor Frankl (1969) found that 20 percent of neuroses in clinical practice are ‘noogenic’, i.e. deriving from a lack of meaning in life. Maddi (1967) defined existential neurosis as the chronic inability to believe in the truth, importance, usefulness or interest value of anything one does or can imagine doing. Hobbs (1962) noted that contemporary neuroses are characterized not so much by repression and conversion (lack of insight) but by lack of a sense of purpose and meaning. Risk can provide meaning. In a world where the direct and immediate threats of disease and dying are low, such as infection and war, but indirect and delayed threats are relatively high, such as cancer and unemployment, focusing on certain aspects of risk can give a purpose in life. Different individuals and social groups define this challenge in different ways, from individualistic striving for success to mass protest movements against environmental degradation.

#### All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved

**Cummisky, 96** (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontologieal constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, each is priceless: thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

### Jeffers

Their sequencing arg is wrong. Insisting they are “political” is a distraction. Micro-politics *won’t* spill-into Macro-politics. This also K’s their co-optation args.

Gitlin ‘97

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Consolation: here is an explanation for the rise of academic cultural studies during precisely the years when the right has held political and economic power longer and more consistently than at any other time in more than a half century. Now, in effect, "the cultural is political," and more, it is regarded as central to the control of political and economic resources. The control of popular culture is held to have become decisive in the fate of contemporary societies--or at least it is the sphere in which opposition can find footing, find breathing space, rally the powerless, defy the grip of the dominant ideas, isolate the powers that be, and prepare for a "war of position" against their dwindling ramparts. On this view, to dwell on the centrality of popular culture is more than an academic's way of filling her hours; it is a useful certification of the people and their projects. To put it more neutrally, the political aura of cultural studies is supported by something like a "false consciousness" premise: the analytical assumption that what holds the ruling groups in power is their capacity to muffle, deform, paralyze, or destroy contrary tendencies of an emotional or ideological nature. By the same token, if there is to be a significant "opposition," it must *first* find a base in popular culture--and first also turns out to be second, third, and fourth, since popular culture is so much more accessible, so much more porous, so much more changeable than the economic and political order. With time, what began as compensation hardened--became institutionalized--into a tradition. Younger scholars gravitated to cultural studies because it was to them incontestable that culture was politics. To do cultural studies, especially in connection with identity politics, was the politics they knew. The contrast with the rest of the West is illuminating. In varying degrees, left-wing intellectuals in France, Italy, Scandinavia, Germany, Spain and elsewhere retain energizing attachments to Social Democratic, Green, and other left-wing parties. There, the association of culture with excellence and traditional elites remains strong. But in the Anglo-American world, including Australia, these conditions scarcely obtain. Here, in a discouraging time, popular culture emerges as a consolation prize. (The same happened in Latin America, with the decline of left-wing hopes.) The sting fades from the fragmentation of the organized left, the metastasis of murderous nationalism, the twilight of socialist dreams virtually everywhere. Class inequality may have soared, ruthless individualism may have intensified, the conditions of life for the poor may have worsened, racial tensions may have mounted, unions and social democratic parties may have weakened or reached an impasse, but never mind. Attend to popular culture, study it with sympathy, and one need not dwell on unpleasant realities. One need not be unduly vexed by electoral defeats. One need not be preoccupied by the ways in which the political culture's center of gravity has moved rightward--or rather, one can put this down to the iron grip of the established media institutions. One need not even be rigorous about what one opposes and what one proposes in its place. Is capitalism the trouble? Is it the particular form of capitalism practiced by multinational corporations in a deregulatory era? Is it patriarchy (and is that the proper term for a society that has seen an upheaval in relations between women and men in the course of a half-century)? Racism? Antidemocracy? Practitioners of cultural studies, like the rest of the academic left, are frequently elusive. Speaking cavalierly of "opposition" and "resistance" permits--rather, cultivates--a certain sloppiness of thinking, making it possible to remain "left" without having to face the most difficult questions of political self-definition. The situation of cultural studies conforms to the contours of our political moment. It confirms--and reinforces--the current paralysis: the incapacity of social movements and dissonant sensibilities to imagine effective forms of public engagement. It substitutes an obsession with popular culture for coherent economic-political thought or a connection with mobilizable populations outside the academy and across identity lines. One must underscore that this is not simply because of cultural studies' default. The default is an effect more than a cause. It has its reasons. The odds are indeed stacked against serious forward motion in conventional politics. Political power is not only beyond reach, but functional majorities disdain it, finding the government and all its works contemptible. Few of the central problems of contemporary civilization are seriously contested within the narrow band of conventional discourse. Unconventional politics, such as it is, is mostly fragmented and self-contained along lines of racial, gender, and sexual identities. One cannot say that cultural studies diverts energy from a vigorous politics that is already in force. Still, insofar as cultural studies makes claims for itself as an insurgent politics, the field is presumptuous and misleading. Its attempt to legitimize the ecstasies of the moment confirms the collective withdrawal from democratic hope. Seeking to find political energies in audiences who function as audiences, rather than in citizens functioning as citizens, the dominant current in cultural studies is pressed willy-nilly toward an uncritical celebration of technological progress. It offers no resistance to the primacy of visual and nonlinear culture over the literary and linear. To the contrary: it embraces technological innovation as soon as the latest developments prove popular. It embraces the sufficiency of markets; its main idea of the intellect's democratic commitment is to flatter the audience. Is there a chance of a modest redemption? Perhaps, if we imagine a harder headed, less wishful cultural studies, free of the burden of imagining itself to be a political practice. A chastened, realistic cultural studies would divest itself of political pretensions. It would not claim to be politics. It would not mistake the academy for the larger society. It would be less romantic about the world--and about itself. Rigorous practitioners of cultural studies should be more curious about the world that remains to be researched--and changed. We would learn more about politics, economy, and society, and in the process, appreciate better what culture, and cultural study, do not accomplish. If we wish to do politics, let us organize groups, coalitions, demonstrations, lobbies, whatever; **let us do politics. Let us not think that our academic work is already that.**

### Cap Good

#### Neoliberalism’s inevitable, no movements, and the alt fails – empirics

Cypher and Wise 11 (James M., and Raúl Delgado, research professor in the doctoral program in development studies at la Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, author of *The Process of Economic Development* and *State and Capital in Mexico: Development Policy since 1940*, AND PhD in social sciences from the University of Pennsylvania, recipient of the 1993 Maestro Jesus Silvia Herzog prize in economics, member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences, member of the National System of Researchers, executive secretary of the International Migration and Development Network, director of the doctoral program in development studies at la Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, October 10, 2011, *Mexico’s Economic Dilemma (The Developmental Failure of Neoliberalism)*, available online at <http://www.kilibro.com/en/book/preview/147236/mexicos-economic-dilemma>, alp)

However, there are no social movements at the moment that would prove to be the catalyst for fundamental change in economic policy. It is important to resist the idea that because neoliberalism has clearly been the underlying cause of the wrenching current crisis both in Mexico and the United States, there will be, ipso facto, a dramatic change in economic and social policy. Here and elsewhere, history is the laboratory of analysis. It is important, therefore, to recall another period that seemed to signal an abandonment of neoliberal policy: in the early 1980s Chile—after having embraced at breakneck speed as much of the neoliberal transition as could be imagined from 1973 onward—was forced to experience a devastating economic and social crisis. Policy makers took a few steps back in certain crucial areas, and they slowed the pace of advance of the neoliberal project. But they did not abandon it. Even when democratic government was restored in the late 1980s and up to the moment under several “socialist” governments, the neoliberal project has remained the bedrock of social and economic policy (Cypher 2004b).

### Space

#### This leads to the overview effect – solves the aff and peace

**Livingston 02** – M.D. in Business

(David, “The Ethical Commercialization of Outer Space”, http://www.davidlivingston.com/publications/The\_Ethical\_Commercialization\_of\_Outer\_Space.pdf)

Most astronauts claim to view Earth differently after having been in space. Often their commentaries show a world that is united in space, but unfortunately absent on Earth. When the Saudi-Arabian Prince Sultan Bin Salman al-Saud went into orbit in June 1985 he said, "I think the minute I saw the view for the first time was really one of the most memorable moments in my entire life."8 When asked by the interviewer how it changed his understanding of God, the Sultan said, "It really strengthens your convictions. To me, it's an opportunity to prove that there is no conflict being a Muslim, or any other religion. Looking at it from here, the troubles all over the world, and not just the Middle East, look very strange as you see the boundaries and border lines disappearing."9 U.S. Congressman Bill Nelson, who went to space in January 1986, said upon his return: "If the superpower leaders could be given the opportunity to see the Earth from the perspective from which I saw it—perhaps at a summit meeting in space in the context of the next century—they might realize that we're all in this with a common denominator. It would have a positive effect on their future decisions concerning war and peace.”10 Such space-based perspectives and their spillover effects on those of us unable to experience space firsthand may ultimately have a greater influence on our commercial space business practices than anything we do or say on Earth. Robert Bigelow of Bigelow Aerospace of Las Vegas was recently interviewed about his announcement to invest $500 million of his own money over the next several years to build a space cruise liner for Earth to moon tourism. Bigelow understands the limitations of our perceptions and the way we do things, especially since we have technology that enables us to do so much. When asked during his interview if his cruise liner would have defenses onboard in case of a meeting with a hostile ET, Bigelow replied: I'm not so sure exactly who the Klingons are. I think the jury is still out on whether or not it’s the human race. I think we have a huge divergence between our paths of improvement on spiritual maturity, while at the same time this century we compare that against the path of our technological advancements. You have to have some harmony. I think in order to be a member of a species that is a space-faring species that other species shouldn't fear, I think you have some type of meeting where your technological maturity is met to some degree with spiritual maturity.11

### Structural Violence

**Collapse is worse for all their impacts---causes extinction of every other species and then humans**

**Monbiot, visiting Environmental Policy professorship at Oxford, 2009**

(George, “Is there any point in fighting to stave off industrial apocalypse?”, 8-17, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>)

**The** interesting **question**, and the one that probably divides us, **is** this: **to what extent should we welcome the** likely **collapse of industrial civilisation?** Or more precisely: **to what extent do we believe that** some **good may come of it?** I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that **the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous**: the **breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive**; **mass starvation; war**. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that **what is likely to come out on the other side will be** **worse than our current settlement.** Here are three observations: 1 **Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over**; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes. From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that **our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive**. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint.